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Too Big to Fail after FDICIA
Larry D. Wall*
In 1993, when this article was originally published, Congress had recently 
passed the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 
(FDICIA) to reduce taxpayers’ exposure to financial system losses, including 
their exposure at “too big to fail” financial institutions. 
In his new preface, the author observes that, by passing FDICIA, Congress 
was signaling that it was “serious about ending 100 percent de facto deposit 
insurance.” He notes that FDICIA’s least-cost resolution provisions were partially 
successful, terminating 100 percent de facto deposit insurance for most banks. 
The recent financial crisis demonstrated, though, that too big to fail has still not 
been eliminated for the very largest banks. 
To provide a background for the debate about what should be done to 
eliminate the persistent problems with existing too big to fail policies, this 
article outlines what Congress originally intended FDICIA to accomplish. 
From its 1993 perspective, the article reviews the controls FDICIA placed on 
regulators’ ability to protect or extend the lives of large banks while keeping 
other policy tools for dealing with systemic risk. The article also discusses some 
lingering systemic risk issues, including the effect of a large bank’s failure on 
financial derivatives markets and the effect of unexpected massive losses at one 
or more banks, as well as FDICIA’s provisions designed to reduce systemic risk.
JEL classification: G21, G28
Key words: too big to fail, FDICIA
*The author is a financial economist and policy adviser in the Atlanta Fed’s  
research department.iii
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T
he Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA) was passed 
in response to the need for congressional appropriations to fund deposit insurance losses in 
the thrift industry in 1989 and predictions that another appropriation would soon be needed to 
cover deposit insurance losses in the banking industry. Prior to the act’s passage, the FDIC and the 
Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation provided 100 percent de facto deposit insurance 
at almost all failed banks. The FDIC did so by comparing bids to acquire the entire bank (including 
all its deposits) with the cost of liquidating the bank, which generally produced the result that 
covering all deposits was less expensive (FDIC 2003, chap. 2). FDICIA sought to change this 
process by mandating least-cost resolution, which required consideration of all possible resolution 
methods (FDIC 2003, chap. 2). This mandate was widely understood as indicating that the FDIC 
should also consider purchase and assumption transactions in which the acquirer assumed only 
the insured deposits. Nevertheless, after FDICIA, some who favored the old procedures were 
quietly saying that all of the bidders for failed banks should be encouraged to bid for the entire 
bank, effectively restoring 100 percent de facto deposit insurance at most failed banks. 
Against that backdrop, I originally wrote the following article in 1993 to say “Congress is 
serious about ending 100 percent de facto deposit insurance. If you have any doubts, look at the 
lengths that it went to to terminate the need for too big to fail.” After reviewing the too big to fail 
provisions in FDICIA, I noted:
If conditions were such that a large fraction of the banking system was potentially not viable, 
regulators may have no choice but to protect uninsured depositors. However, for most other 
systemic risk situations, including financial market risk, the potential still exists for identifying 
and developing solutions. A careful review of FDICIA’s provisions makes it clear that Congress 
is looking for an end to operating under a too big to fail policy and not for more explanations as 
to why too big to fail treatment is essential. 
In the event, the least-cost resolution provisions of FDICIA were at least a partial success, 
terminating 100 percent de facto deposit insurance for almost all banks. Whether too big to fail 
had been eliminated for the very largest banks was unclear until the recent financial crisis because 
none of the largest banks were put into resolution until then (with the failure of Wachovia). What 
was clear was the absence of the public planning to deal with a too big to fail situation that would 
be essential if losses were to be imposed on uninsured depositors and other creditors.1 
The lack of a clear policy for dealing with too big to fail was a topic of concern for many 
students of the banking industry. An exhaustive review of the literature is far beyond the scope of 
this short preface. But I would like to call attention to just a few of the efforts from my colleagues 
around the Federal Reserve System. Gary Stern and Ron Feldman from the Federal Reserve 
Bank of Minneapolis spoke and wrote about the problem in a number of forums starting in 1997 
and culminating in their book, Too Big to Fail: The Hazards of Bank Bailouts, published in 
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2004. Also in 2004, the topic of the Chicago Federal Reserve Bank’s annual International Banking 
Conference was Systemic Financial Crises: Resolving Large Bank Insolvencies (Evanoff and 
Kaufman 2005).2 In 2005, Mark Flannery (currently visiting at the Federal Reserve Bank of New 
York) proposed the use of reverse convertible securities, a type of contingent capital, to provide a 
mechanism for private sector recapitalization of distressed banks that may be too big to fail. 
The following article, originally published in 1993, describes the situation Congress had faced 
and its response in an attempt to end too big to fail. For an analysis that reaches a not very 
satisfying conclusion on the current state of the too big to fail issue, see Wall (2010). That article 
reiterates that we still do not have an adequate response to a situation where a “large fraction of 
the banking system was potentially not viable,” described as a “too many to fail” problem. It also 
notes that the resolution of large financial groups operating across international borders could 
require an international agreement on failure resolution, which does not currently exist. 
1. Even an otherwise perfect supervisory plan for dealing with too big to fail will be doomed to failure if it is kept private 
while market participants believe that too big to fail is still in force. The problem is that if market participants are 
surprised by a sudden termination of too big to fail, they will want to reevaluate their exposures and likely immediately 
recontract with all of the surviving banks they previously thought were too big to fail. Indeed, one could view much of 
the market turmoil post-Lehman as financial markets responding to a change in subjective expectations that some very 
large financial firms were too big to fail.
2. The topic of too big to fail has also been a regular feature of the Chicago Fed’s annual Bank Structure and Competi- 
tion Conference.
Evanoff, Douglas, and George Kaufman, eds. 2005. 
Systemic financial crises: Resolving large bank 
insolvencies. Hackensack, N.J.: World Scientific 
Publishing Company.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 2003. 
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reshandbook/index. html (March 9, 2010). 
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In Capital adequacy beyond Basel: Banking, 
securities, and insurance, edited by H.S. Scott. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. www.cba.ufl.edu/fire/
docs/publishedpapers/Published_RCD_Chapter.pdf 
(November 28, 2009). 
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T
he special treatment historically accorded large failing banks—judging them “too big to fail”—
is an important issue in reforming deposit insurance. All unaffiliated depositors, and in some 
cases all creditors, at large failing banks have received 100 percent coverage of their funds even 
though coverage of only the first $100,000 deposited at domestic branches is guaranteed by law.1 
Following this too big to fail policy has been justified in part as necessary for preventing systemic 
problems that might grow from a larger bank’s difficulties. However, the policy itself created 
problems. It tended to reduce the incentive for large depositors to exercise market discipline, 
and it tended to increase the cost of resolving large failing banks.2 Further, operating under a 
too big to fail policy created a dilemma for bank regulatory agencies, which had to either leave 
large depositors at small banks uninsured and create an artificial incentive for large deposits to be 
shifted to too big to fail banks or cover all deposits at all banks, further reducing market discipline 
at small banks and increasing the cost of resolving small bank failures. 
Congress addressed the too big to fail issue as a part of its deposit insurance reform bill, the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991 (FDICIA). Section 141 of the 
act generally requires the resolution of failed banks at the lowest cost to the FDIC, though it 
provides for an exception that preserves the potential for banks to be considered too big to fail. 
The exception may be invoked if failure to do so would “have serious adverse effects on economic 
conditions or financial stability” and providing additional FDIC coverage “would avoid or mitigate 
such adverse effects.” FDICIA allows the exception only with the agreement of a two-thirds majority 
of the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, a two-thirds majority of 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the Secretary of the Treasury (“in 
consultation with the President”). 
Two of the goals of FDICIA are to reduce both the potential for systemic problems and bank 
regulatory agencies’ incentives to follow a too big to fail policy. Having given a mandate to banking 
agencies to minimize FDIC losses, the act’s prompt corrective action provisions provide a structured 
way of addressing a problem bank. A system of automatic review is set in motion whenever a bank 
failure imposes material costs on the FDIC or when the FDIC treats a bank as too big to fail.3 
Specific changes intended to limit systemic risk include requiring the Federal Reserve to impose 
limits on interbank liabilities, authorizing the FDIC to provide for a final net settlement to a failed 
bank’s creditors, and establishing statutory backing for net settlement provisions in bilateral and 
clearinghouse payments agreements. 
FDICIA also leaves in place the Federal Reserve’s discount window, which is a powerful tool 
for addressing systemic risk. Indeed, only the Federal Reserve is guaranteed to have the resources 
to be able to address virtually all conceivable systemic risk situations because only the Fed has the 
power to create money. However, FDICIA discourages inappropriate uses of the discount window 
by requiring the Federal Reserve to share in the FDIC’s losses if lengthy Fed lending to a failing 
bank causes an increase in the FDIC’s losses.4 
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FDICIA substantially reduces if not eliminates most of the dangers associated with the failure   
of a large bank. Some systemic risk issues remain, however, and the purpose of this article is to 
review those concerns as well as FDICIA’s provisions designed to reduce such risks. Probably the 
biggest unresolved issue is what the effects of a large bank’s failure would be. According to some 
preliminary analysis, a too big to fail policy may not be needed to protect financial markets. 
Systemic risk
The concern about systemic risk stems from a fear that a single bank failure could reverberate through 
the banking system and cause widespread bank failures, adversely affecting bank customers and the 
real economy in a number of ways. However, not every run on a large bank automatically generates 
systemic problems. A depositor run on any nonviable bank not 100 percent insured is rational and 
helps speed closure of an institution that should be closed. Further, the argument that large bank 
creditors suffer losses in such a closing is not, in and of itself, a legitimate systemic concern.5
Systemic risk arises when an institution’s failure interferes with financial services consumers’ 
ability to obtain important financial services in a timely manner to such an extent that overall eco-
nomic activity is reduced.6 Systemic problems result if the failure of a large bank causes contagious 
runs on viable banks, thereby diminishing the overall availability of financial services. In addition, 
failure of a single institution may generate systemic problems if it significantly impairs the pay-
ments system or financial markets. This section highlights the channels through which it would be 
possible for systemic risk concerns to arise. An analysis of the actual magnitude of these risks prior 
to FDICIA is provided in the sidebar on page 4. 
Risks to other banks. The failure of one bank poses a potential risk to other banks in a 
number of ways. For example, other banks could suffer insolvency because of losses on interbank 
deposits and other forms of credit. They risk illiquidity if access to interbank deposits is delayed or 
if contagious deposit runs occur. The extent of such risks is usually, but not always, proportional 
to the size of the failing bank. Larger banks have more interbank deposits likely to be at risk if 
depositors are not covered, and large bank failures are likely to be noticed by more depositors. 
The magnitude of the credit and direct liquidity risks is also a function of whether the col-
lapse of the failed bank occurs over a long period of time or comes as a surprise. If the failure is 
anticipated, other banks will have had time to implement steps limiting their exposure to the failing 
organization. In this vein, financially strong banks have recently been limiting their exposure to 
banks with lower credit ratings in the interest rate and currency swap markets. 
Risks to the nonbank sector. Nonbank customers and even third parties may also be hurt 
by a bank’s failure. Creditors, including large depositors, directly risk default losses and reduced 
liquidity when a bank fails. While these risks are analogous to those taken by providers of interbank 
credit, they differ principally in that nonbank customers, especially small businesses, may have 
1. “Too big to fail” does not literally mean that a bank cannot fail. The shareholders in large banks have lost their investment, 
and the managers have been fired. A bank is considered too big to fail when it is thought to be too large to close in a way 
that imposes losses on uninsured depositors and certain other creditors. 
2. Large depositors are not protected when a bank is liquidated, but they have frequently been covered when a failed bank 
has been sold as a part of a purchase and assumption transaction or when the FDIC assumed ownership of the failed 
organization and operated it as a bridge bank. The FDIC generally has sought to avoid liquidating a bank in order to 
preserve any franchise value remaining in the organization. However, the FDIC can preserve the franchise value without 
providing 100 percent coverage to all depositors by transferring only the insured deposits to the successor organization. 
3. The act defines a material loss as one exceeding the greater of $25 million or 2 percent of the institution’s total assets, 
whichever is greater. 
4. The exact restrictions on Fed lending are discussed in the section titled “Incentive changes.” 
5. Indeed, if a bank is closed by regulatory or market pressure before it wipes out its capital, losses to creditors should be 
small to nonexistent. 
6. Gorton (1988) and Tallman (1988) challenge the view that bank panics caused declines in real economic activity. 
However, this debate is beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to note that policymakers in the United States have 
believed that systemic problems could adversely affect the real economy. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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less access to other sources of liquidity. Nonbank firms can turn to the Federal Reserve discount 
window under certain situations if a substantial liquidity problem arises, but the central bank has 
strongly preferred to avoid such lending.7 Moreover, even if the Federal Reserve chose to lend to 
nonbank customers, the discount window is not structured to serve as a direct lender to a large 
number of small businesses.8
The ability of bank customers to make payments depends not only on their bank’s being 
solvent and liquid but also on the operation of various payments systems. The failure of a 
large correspondent bank, which provides check-clearing, ACH, and other ongoing payments 
services to certain small banks, could directly affect the small banks’ access to certain parts 
of the payments system. Moreover, such a failure could lead to a loss of confidence in bilateral 
and  clearinghouse  arrangements  that  handle  a  large  fraction  of  the  payments  transactions. 
While the Federal Reserve is an important supplier of many payments services and could help 
sustain confidence in its systems, private arrangements play a critical role in some—especially 
international—payments systems. 
Another problem nonbank customers might face when a bank fails is a temporary reduction 
in credit availability. Such a reduction might affect local economic conditions adversely.9 However, 
implementing a too big to fail policy would protect bank borrowers only to the extent that doing so 
would prevent contagious runs on viable banks. Borrowers are not necessarily protected by efforts 
to protect depositors because whoever holds the loans after the bank’s failure does not have to 
extend any prefailure loans. Further, because the postfailure loan holder could demand repayment 
at the earliest time permitted by the loan contract, protecting a failed bank’s depositors would not 
protect its borrowers. 
This list of issues has recently been expanded by increased concern about ways a bank failure 
would affect financial markets. Banks play an increasing role as market makers in many financial 
contracts, especially for interest rate and foreign exchange contingent contracts such as options, 
forward contracts, caps, floors, and swaps. The failure of certain large banks might significantly 
reduce this market-making capacity for some types of financial contracts. More generally, a bank’s 
failure could result in a loss of confidence in certain markets, with the result that some banks 
would be unable to maintain adequate hedges for their existing exposure. 
Systemic risk. While certain problems plague a too big to fail policy, it is nonetheless an effective 
way to limit systemic risk. It prevents one bank’s failure from creating any direct solvency or liquidity 
risk for other banks or nonbank creditors. Its enactment also reduces the risk of contagious runs at 
other banks by reassuring their depositors. A challenge FDICIA attempts to meet is establishing ways 
to eliminate the too big to fail doctrine while continuing to minimize systemic risk. 
Incentive changes
FDICIA both provides regulators with various tools for addressing problem banks and suggests 
changes in regulatory procedures.10 A simple reading of the act may not disclose its real significance, 
  7. One reason for the Federal Reserve to be reluctant to lend to nonbank firms is that, because discount window lending must 
be fully collateralized, such lending could imperil the position of the firm’s creditors. Thus, if the Fed lends to nonviable 
nonbank firms it may be transferring wealth away from creditors that cannot or do not withdraw their investment. The 
Federal Reserve is also not generally in a position to judge the viability of nonbank firms because the agency does not 
examine and rarely monitors the financial condition of specific nonfinancial firms.
  8. For further discussion of the historic operation of the discount window see the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System (1985, chap. 4) and Garcia and Plautz (1988). 
  9. Calomiris, Hubbard, and Stock (1986) and Gilbert and Kochin (1989) have found that the failure of one or more banks 
may have negative effects on its regional economy. In Gilbert and Kochin’s research the effects are largest in two of the 
three states in their sample if a bank is closed rather than merged with another institution. 
10. Many provisions of FDICIA, including the general prompt corrective action provisions and the definition of material 
loss, have delayed effective dates or phase-in clauses. This article focuses on the effects of FDICIA after all parts of the 
act have taken full effect. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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Systemic risk before FDICIA
      n important issue in evaluating whether   
      FDICIA  is  contributing  significantly  to 
reducing  systemic  risk  is  determining  the 
baseline likelihood of a financial system collapse 
among  generally  viable  banks  before  FDICIA. 
Three commonly expressed concerns about large 
bank failure need to be considered: The first is 
the idea that interbank liabilities could generate 
credit losses leading to widespread insolvency 
or that delays in access to interbank liabilities 
could cause widespread illiquidity. The second 
concern is that the failure of a large bank might 
spark runs on viable banks. The third, and farther- 
reaching, fear is that payments systems may 
collapse in the wake of a large bank’s failure. 
The  analysis  below  seeks  to  address  two 
questions central to evaluating FDICIA’s merit: 
(1) What are the odds that one of these three 
problems  would in fact emerge, and (2) how 
do the banking agencies’ pre-FDICIA tools for 
mitigating a problem at a large bank compare 
with the tools post-FDICIA? 
Interbank liabilities
The  most  direct  risk  a  large  bank’s  failure 
poses for other banks is that they will lose 
part or all of their investment in that bank. A 
sudden failure incurring massive losses could 
threaten the financial stability of respondent 
banks. However, determining the level of systemic 
risk  should  include  distinguishing  maximum 
possible losses from expected losses. Expected 
losses for a bank closed when it first becomes 
insolvent are likely to be a small fraction of pos- 
sible losses. For example, total interbank expo- 
sure  to  Continental  Illinois  greatly  overstated 
other banks’ likely losses when Continental   
was rescued by the FDIC. There were 65 banks 
with uninsured balances in Continental exceed-
ing 100 percent of their capital, and another 
101 banks had uninsured balances equal to 
between 50 percent and 100 percent of their 
capital. However, if a recovery rate of 90 per-
cent is assumed for Continental’s assets, no banks 
would have had losses in excess of their capital 
and  only  two  banks  would  have  had  losses 
equal to between 50 percent and 100 percent 
of their capital.1 George G. Kaufman (1990)
states that the FDIC’s estimated recoveries at     
the time of failure of Continental were 97 per- 
cent to 98 percent and that the current estimate 
is 96 percent. 
Even  when  a  failure  would  not  result  in 
substantial credit losses on interbank deposits, 
theoretically it might still place other banks at 
risk if they could not obtain immediate access to 
their funds or if they were to experience a run 
by  depositors  fearing  insolvency  or  illiquidity. 
However, the danger is not as great as it sounds. 
Even  if  the  FDIC  did  not  provide  immediate 
access to interbank deposits, other banks would 
not necessarily fail because of illiquidity. A bank 
widely recognized as viable despite temporary 
illiquidity  could  probably  borrow  from  other 
banks or the Federal Reserve discount window. 
Contagious bank runs
One bank’s failure may lead to withdrawals at 
other banks if customers lose confidence that their 
deposits will be fully redeemed. Depositors may also 
lose confidence because the failure discloses new 
information on the value of other banks’ assets.2 
The likelihood that financial markets will 
mistakenly run on solvent banks is important 
1. These figures on other banks’ exposure to Continental Illinois came from U.S. Congress (1984, 16–18). 
2. Finance theory provides a third reason for depositors to lose confidence: they could become concerned about their 
bank’s inability to meet an increase in demand for liquidity by other depositors. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) have 
developed a model in which banks are solvent at the beginning of the period but are subject to a random amount of 
withdrawal by depositors. The bank must prematurely liquidate projects at a loss if deposit withdrawals are too high. 
If too many projects are liquidated, the bank may become insolvent. Empirical examples that correspond exactly 
to the Diamond and Dybvig model are hard to find. However, the U.S. banking system in the late 1800s and early 
1900s was subject to periodic liquidity crises during and shortly after harvest season, and some evidence suggests 
that the crises were due entirely to liquidity concerns about individual banks. A model of inelastic currency supply 
developed by Champ, Smith, and Williamson (1991) suggests the potential for periodic liquidity crisis and provides 
some evidence on the problem. However, Calomiris and Gorton (l99l) raise questions about this history of panics in 
the period prior to the formation of the Fed. In any case, such random withdrawal models are not closely examined 
here because there is no evidence to suggest that such a problem has occurred since the Fed’s creation or that the 
Fed could not fully resolve any liquidity-based runs with its existing authority. The Federal Reserve can and does 
provide an elastic supply of currency and liquidity. 
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in evaluating the risk of bank runs. Empirical 
evidence suggests that financial markets generally 
are  able  to  assess  the  implications  of  new 
information accurately. For example, analysis of 
the Mexican debt crisis revealed that the stock 
market responded to individual bank stocks in 
proportion to each bank’s loan exposure even 
though such information had not been publicly 
released.3 Studies of five major domestic failures 
also found no substantial evidence of contagion 
risk.4 Further, when a misleading television story 
prompted a run on Old Stone, the thrift was able 
to stop the run within two days by convincing 
investors it was solvent.5
There are also some puzzling examples of 
possible market mistakes, however. The failure 
of the Overseas Trust Bank in Hong Kong and 
that of Penn Square Bank in the United States 
are two such cases. Gerald D. Gay, Stephen G. 
Timme, and Kenneth Yung (1991) found evidence 
that the failure of the Hong Kong bank had a 
significant  negative  impact  on  other  banks  in 
the  city.  This  result  is  surprising  because  the 
Overseas  Trust  Bank’s  failure  resulted  from 
fraud, and such conditions would generally not 
be  expected  to  provide  significant  information 
about  other  banks.  In  the  case  of  the  Penn 
Square Bank, Robert E. Lamy and G. Rodney 
Thompson (1986) and John W. Peavy III and 
George H. Hempel (1988) discovered that banks 
with no direct connections to the organization 
nevertheless suffered significant losses in stock 
market valuation after that bank failed. Lamy and 
Thompson suggest that the drop in market value 
reflected the fact that Penn Square was liquidated 
with losses to depositors, and this action could 
have  raised  doubts  about  coverage  afforded 
other banks. Another explanation, by Peavy and 
Hempel, is that the market may have overreacted 
to the news of Penn Square’s failure. Supporting 
that  hypothesis,  their  findings  indicate  that 
losses suffered immediately after the failure by 
banks not directly connected to Penn Square 
were subsequently offset by significant positive 
abnormal returns for institutions. 
Another study supplies weak evidence that 
there may be reason for concern about conta-
gious runs. Randall J. Pozdena (1991) found that 
similarities in stock returns for firms in the same 
industry were much greater in banking than in 
other  industries,  suggesting  that  bank  values 
may be more dependent on a common set of 
factors than those of many other industries. 
Pozdena also found that similarities in returns 
were fewer among banks with higher capital ratios. 
Thus,  there  seems  to  be  a  risk  that  the 
failure of a large bank could spark contagious 
runs on viable banks if the markets fail to distin- 
guish viable from nonviable banks. Studies of 
financial market performance generally suggest 
that markets tend to assess the implications of 
new information accurately. Some evidence of 
occasional errors has been found, however. Thus, 
at  least  a  small  potential  for  contagious  runs 
apparently exists. The risk is minimized, though, 
by the Federal Reserve’s option to provide fund-
ing to any viable bank experiencing a run.
 
Payments systems
Other  banks  and  the  financial  system  may  be 
exposed  to  a  failed  bank  through  their  joint 
connections to the payments system.6 The risk 
may occur through one of several mechanisms—
the bilateral provision of services from the failed 
bank to its respondent, securities positions taken 
by the failed bank that need to be unwound, or a 
3. See Cornell and Shapiro (1986) and Smirlock and Kaufold (1987). 
4. Aharony and Swary (l983) found that no significant abnormal bank stock returns occurred around the failures of 
the United States National Bank of San Diego in 1973 and Hamilton National Bank in 1976. They did find significant 
negative abnormal returns associated with the failure of Franklin National Bank in 1974, but they suggest that this 
result could be based on a revaluation of the risks associated with foreign exchange trading. Aharony and Swary 
further note that some European banks were taking foreign exchange losses around this time. Former FDIC Director 
Irvine H. Sprague (1986) argued that regulators were concerned about the potential failure of other large banks if 
Continental Illinois failed in 1984 with losses to depositors. Saunders (1987), Swary (1986), and Wall and Peterson 
(1990) failed to find clear-cut evidence to support the regulators’ concerns. Dickinson, Peterson, and Christiansen 
(1991) also failed to find evidence of contagion around the time of the failure of the First Republic Bank in 1988.
5. The story of how the run was stopped is provided by Leander (1991). 
6. Haraf (1991) has noted that the failure of a nonbank institution can also impose strains on various payments 
mechanisms. For example, Fedwire and the Clearing House for Interbank Payments (CHIPS) were forced to remain 
open longer than usual to accommodate problems arising from the failure of Drexel, Burnham, Lambert. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
E C O N O M I C   R E V I E W   Number 1, 2010 6
failure’s effect on payments clearinghouses. The 
discussion that follows focuses on the potential 
for  a  bank  failure  to  disrupt  the  processes  by 
which payments are made in the banking system.7
Many small banks are dependent on cor-
respondent banks for services such as check 
clearing, automated clearinghouse services, and 
access to international payments systems. Loss of 
access to these services could create significant 
problems for some respondent banks, especially 
those that are too small to participate directly 
in certain payments systems. If a failing bank 
deteriorates gradually, respondents may reduce 
their  risk  by  shifting  their  payments  system 
business to other banks that are still financially 
strong or by making contingency plans. How-
ever, respondents that are still dependent at 
the time of failure would not necessarily lose 
access to the payments system. In the case of 
a troubled institution large enough to be an 
important  supplier  of  correspondent  services, 
the FDIC, under FDICIA, would likely try to sell 
the bank and could otherwise be expected to 
create and operate a bridge bank. Because the 
FDIC has these powers, invoking a too big to fail 
policy is not essential for preserving respondent 
banks’ access to the payments system. 
Another bilateral issue that can affect pay- 
ments systems concerns exchanging cash and 
various  securities.  The  problem  is  that  the 
exchange of value does not always occur simul-
taneously.  Solvent  parties  are  reluctant  to 
surrender their part of the transaction before 
receiving value from the bankrupt party for 
fear that prompt and full payment will not be 
forthcoming. William S. Haraf (1991) noted that 
this situation occurred with the failure of the 
securities firm of Drexel, Burnham, Lambert 
in  1990  and  that  third  parties  were  affected 
by the disruption.8 Haraf also notes, however, 
that changes, some of which are being imple-
mented, to the payments and settlement sys-
tems designed to shorten or eliminate lags in 
payments would be more efficient than resorting 
to declaring certain institutions too big to fail. 
(He further notes that, despite some delays in 
winding up Drexel’s affairs, their positions were 
ultimately liquidated.) 
Multilateral clearinghouse arrangements may 
also be strained by the failure of a bank. These 
arrangements allow their bank members to make 
payments to each other with a single net pay- 
ment at the end of each day to cover any net 
credit balances.9 Transactions through clearing-
houses may generate significant bilateral credit 
between banks. If the clearinghouse lacks a 
binding netting agreement and one bank fails 
to make a required payment, the failed banks 
are converted to bilateral agreements and the 
net positions of all other banks are recalculated. 
The danger is that banks that could have met 
their net position with the failed bank included 
may be unable to do so if the failed bank’s posi-
tion is excluded.10 Thus, the potential exists 
for a single bank’s failure to cascade through a 
payments system, forcing a number of banks to 
become illiquid and causing a loss of confidence 
in the entire netting arrangement. 
The Federal Reserve has worked to reduce 
this  risk  by  requiring  banks  to  monitor  and 
establish caps on their intraday liabilities and 
credit exposure to other banks. In addition, as 
a continuation of pre-FDICIA efforts to contain 
payments system risk, the Federal Reserve is 
imposing  interest  charges  on  banks  that  run 
large intraday overdrafts on Fedwire.11 If a prob-
lem arises despite these restrictions the Federal 
Reserve retains adequate power under FDICIA 
to provide discount window loans to viable banks 
that temporarily lack liquidity. 
  7. See Baer and Evanoff (1990) for a review and analysis of the issues associated with large dollar value payments 
systems. Roberds (1993) discusses ways of further controlling the risks of those systems. 
  8. Moen and Tallman (1992) found that the failure of nonbank firms also disrupted the payments system in the Panic 
of 1907. 
  9. For an example of such a system, see the discussion of CHIPS provided by the Group of Experts on Payments 
Systems (1990, 131–42). 
10. Given that the failed bank was presumably financially weak immediately prior to failure, there is a high probability 
that depositors were, on net, withdrawing substantial amounts of money from the failing bank. These withdrawals 
would likely be transferred to other banks, with a substantial part of the withdrawals going through clearinghouses. 
Thus, odds are relatively high that, if a bank fails, it will be a large net payer to various clearinghouses. 
11. See Cummins (1992) for a discussion of the Federal Reserve’s decision to charge for intraday overdrafts. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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however. Before FDICIA, regulators already had the power to enforce capital requirements and 
to stop unsafe or unsound banking practices. Thus, many of the tools the legislation specified 
were implicit in the agencies’ existing authority. Moreover, many of the most important suggested 
changes in regulatory procedure are simply suggestions (as Richard Scott Carnell 1992 points 
out). The regulatory agencies retain substantial discretion in their treatment of problem banks, 
especially large ones. 
The act’s real significance is that it both provides the banking agencies with a clear goal of 
minimizing deposit insurance losses and sets up an incentive system to encourage compliance. 
The most important part of the act in terms of setting the goal and incentive system is section 131, 
which provides for prompt corrective action. That section begins by giving banking agencies one 
goal: “to resolve the problems of insured depository institutions at the least possible long-term 
cost to the deposit insurance fund.” Toward that end, regulators are encouraged to strengthen 
bank capital, to respond to reduced capital levels by taking strong action that will limit risk and 
encourage recapitalization, and to close failing banks before they exhaust their equity capital. The 
provisions for prompt corrective action outline a number of steps that bank regulators may take 
as an institution’s capital ratios decline. Although regulators generally retain the authority to tailor 
their actions to the specific circumstances, FDICIA mandates action in two particular situations: 
(1) banks that are undercapitalized must submit an acceptable plan to restore their capital to 
adequate levels, and (2) banking agencies must take action within ninety days of a bank becoming 
critically undercapitalized, with the act containing a bias toward receivership or conservatorship.11
Although the prompt corrective action guidelines specify regulatory action, they include a 
mandatory ex post review of any failure that imposes material costs on the FDIC and thus provide 
an incentive for regulators to prevent costly bank failures. If a material loss occurs, the inspector 
general of the appropriate banking agency must determine why and must make recommendations 
for preventing such a loss in the future. This report must be made available to the Comptroller 
General of the United States, to any member of Congress upon request, and to the general public 
through the Freedom of Information Act. Further, the General Accounting Office must provide an 
7
Summary
Two common themes run throughout this review 
of the risk of systemic problems in the absence 
of a too big to fail policy prior to FDICIA. First, 
although some risk of losses on interbank liabil- 
ities, contagious runs, and failures in the pay-
ments system existed, that risk frequently has 
been overstated. Second, the Federal Reserve 
could have contained most systemic risk situa- 
tions through the discount window.12 The most
likely system risk scenarios would have involved 
temporary, widespread liquidity problems but 
limited actual solvency problems. The Federal 
Reserve’s discount window had, as it does now, 
the  resources  to  resolve  temporary  liquidity 
problems.  Furthermore,  the  Federal  Reserve 
has historically had detailed, timely information 
on  banks  as  a  result  of  its  supervision  and 
regulation and on the payments system as a 
consequence of its role as a provider of pay-
ments services. Thus, the Fed has had both the 
tools and the knowledge required to effectively 
address  systemic  risk  situations  arising  from 
temporary liquidity problems.
12. See Smith and Wall (1992) for a discussion of how discount window and deposit insurance operations could 
address systemic risk issues without reliance on a too big to fail policy.
11. FDICIA  creates  five  categories  based  on  capital  levels:  well-capitalized,  adequately  capitalized,  undercapitalized, 
significantly undercapitalized, and critically undercapitalized banks. Any bank having a tangible equity-capital-to-total-
assets ratio of less than 2 percent is classified as critically undercapitalized. The act also provides that bank regulators 
may place a bank in receivership or conservatorship on a number of other grounds, including violation of a cease-and-
desist order, concealment of records or assets, inability to cover deposit withdrawals, and an undercapitalized bank’s 
failure to develop a plan that would raise its capital or its material noncompliance with a plan to raise capital. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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annual review of the reports and recommended improvements in supervision. These reporting and 
review requirements do not force the banking agencies to make any substantive changes in their 
supervisory practices. However, as discussed, these provisions supply strong political incentives to 
prevent costly bank failures. 
Two sections of FDICIA—sections 141 and 142—change the legislative guidelines for deposit 
insurance and discount window decisions on banks that might be considered too big to fail. Section 
141 generally requires the FDIC to resolve bank failures at the least possible cost to the deposit 
insurance fund. The agency must document its evaluation of the 
alternative methods of resolving a failed bank, including the key 
assumptions on which the evaluation is based. 
While section 141 permits a systemic risk exception to least 
costly  resolution,  it  also  provides  for  increased  accountability 
when this exception is invoked. The FDIC, the Federal Reserve, 
and the U.S. Treasury must all agree that an institution’s ill-health 
poses a systemic risk. The Secretary of the Treasury is required to 
document evidence indicating the need to invoke the systemic risk 
exception. The General Accounting Office must review any actions 
taken, examining the basis for finding action necessary and analyzing the implications for the actions of 
other insured depositories and uninsured depositors. The rest of the banking industry, required to 
pay the cost of a bailout through an emergency assessment to the FDIC that is proportional to each 
bank’s average total tangible assets, is likely to act as a kind of watchdog.12 The special assessment 
provides a strong incentive for the industry to question covering uninsured depositors, particularly 
when there is room for doubt about whether a failure would create systemic risk. 
Section 142 limits the Federal Reserve’s ability to provide through its discount window 
de facto too big to fail treatment of a failing bank. Allowing a bank to borrow at the discount 
window makes it possible for uninsured deposits to be withdrawn prior to the resolution of a 
failing bank by providing the liquidity needed to cover withdrawals. This section of FDICIA 
limits such lending to undercapitalized banks to 60 days within any 120-day period unless 
the bank is certified as viable by the Federal Reserve or its primary federal bank regulator.13 
For banks that are critically undercapitalized the Federal Reserve is instructed to demand 
repayment no later than at the end of five days. If violation of the five-day limit occurs, the Fed 
is  liable  for  part  of  the  increased  cost  to  the  FDIC,  and  the  Board  of  Governors  of  the 
Federal Reserve must notify Congress of any payments to the FDIC under this provision. 
Under FDICIA the Federal Reserve discount window retains substantial legal authority to lend 
to problem banks, but failure to comply with the intent of this portion of the act exposes the 
Fed to substantial ex post political pressure. 
FDICIA clearly provides a mandate to banking agencies and seeks to create a system whereby 
there is political incentive for the agencies to follow the mandate. The biggest changes to occur as 
a result of the act will most likely result from the new climate of postfailure reviews and sanctions 
rather than from formal changes in the agencies’ legal powers. 
Changes that mitigate systemic risk
Along with supplying a mandate to minimize FDIC losses, FDICIA addresses a number of systemic 
concerns raised by the banking agencies. The act aims to reduce the systemic risk associated with 
8
12. Normal FDIC premiums are calculated on the basis of a bank’s total domestic deposits. The expanded premium base 
provided in FDICIA for emergency assessments will tend to increase the relative proposition of costs borne by banks 
with  foreign  deposits  and  substantial  nondeposit  liabilities.  Because  banks  with  foreign  deposits  and  substantial 
nondeposit liabilities tend to be larger and to affect the financial system more significantly, the effect of FDICIA may be 
to shift more of the costs to the banks most likely to receive too big to fail treatment. 
13. A critically undercapitalized bank is not viable according to the definition in the act. 
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ending a too big to fail policy by enhancing the overall stability of the banking system, by reducing 
the  losses  when  a  bank  fails,  and  through  targeted  reforms  that  address  specific  potentially 
systemic problems.14 
Enhanced stability and more timely closure. A number of reforms in FDICIA call for 
reducing the likelihood of bank failure. The prompt corrective action provisions should result in 
higher bank capital ratios and are intended to ensure more timely supervisory intervention. The 
act requires that regulators revise existing credit risk–based capital standards to take account of 
interest rate risk, concentration of credit risk, and the risks of nontraditional activities. In addition, 
banks must undergo an annual, full-scope, on-site examination and an independent annual audit. 
These measures should help prevent significant undetected problems from arising at banks. 
The prompt corrective action requirements that critically undercapitalized banks be placed 
in conservatorship or receivership mean that banks may be closed earlier with reduced losses to 
creditors.15 Banks may also be closed earlier with higher expected recoveries to the extent that 
uninsured depositors become more likely to run on failing banks because of FDICIA’s provisions 
virtually eliminating coverage of uninsured depositors. 
Limits on interbank credit exposure. The banking system relies heavily on interbank 
extensions of credit for intraday, overnight, and longer-term purposes, but interbank credit 
is a potential source of systemic risk. FDICIA directs the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve to develop a regulation limiting interbank credit exposure. The Board has adopted a 
new Regulation F on interbank liabilities to satisfy this part of FDICIA.16 The regulation restricts 
a bank’s total exposure to its correspondent to 25 percent of the respondent’s capital unless the 
correspondent is at least adequately capitalized.17
Final net settlement. Without immediate access to their funds at a failed bank, both bank 
and nonbank creditors could face severe liquidity problems. FDICIA addresses this problem by 
authorizing the FDIC to make a final settlement with creditors when it assumes receivership 
of a failed bank (section 416). Under these provisions uninsured and unsecured creditors may 
gain immediate access to their funds. The FDIC pays a sum that is the product of the amount of 
uninsured and unsecured claims times a final settlement rate. The final settlement rate is to be 
based on average FDIC receivership recovery experience so that the FDIC receives no more and 
no less than it would have as a general creditor standing in the place of the insured depositors. The 
FDIC’s exercise of full powers under the final settlement provision should substantially alleviate 
liquidity problems for bank creditors. 
Netting of interbank payments. Many payments systems result in banks’ experiencing 
substantial intraday credit exposure to other financial institutions. This exposure may arise both as a 
9
14. An argument may also be made that the net effect of FDICIA will be to weaken banks. The act will increase the number 
of regulatory requirements imposed on banks (including some requirements such as Truth in Savings that are unrelated 
to bank safety) and will also increase bank reporting requirements. It does nothing to enhance banks’ ability to compete 
with nonbank financial firms, which continue to take market share in many of the bank’s most profitable markets while 
remaining free from most of the costly safety and consumer regulations imposed on banks. Moreover, the act was 
passed in an environment in which deposit insurance premiums had been substantially increased on healthy banks to 
rebuild the insurance fund. 
This argument that FDICIA will weaken banks has some merit but probably misjudges the impact of what is and is 
not in the act. FDICIA probably will strengthen the financial condition of individual banks and reduce the risk of bank 
failures that impose significant costs on the banking system. Banks that cannot strengthen their financial position will 
likely be forced to merge. Instead, the effect of higher regulatory costs will be that banks will continue to concede 
market share to nonbank firms in markets in which the law has made banks less competitive. 
15. No losses need occur if a bank is closed before its losses become too large. However, closing a bank before its capital 
reaches zero does not guarantee that losses will be avoided unless bank assets are valued at liquidation prices. See 
Berger, King, and O’Brien (1991) for a discussion of the alternative definitions of “market value” and their limitations. 
16. See the press release from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System dated July 14, 1992, Docket 
No. R-0769. 
17. The regulation on interbank liabilities uses a definition of “adequately capitalized” that is similar but not identical to that 
used to fulfill the prompt corrective action sections of FDICIA. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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result of bilateral agreements and through payments clearing organizations. FDICIA seeks to reduce 
the risk in these payments systems by explicitly recognizing contractual netting agreements and 
holding them legally binding if a member financial institution is closed. (Section 403 establishes that 
bilateral netting agreements are binding, and section 404 applies to clearing organization netting.) 
Implications of the changes. The net effect of FDICIA should be to reduce interbank risk 
substantially. The prompt corrective action provisions and the increase in market discipline are 
expected to constrain bank risk taking and increase the FDIC’s rate of recovery from failed banks. 
In combination, these factors should almost eliminate the risk that one bank’s failure would cause 
insolvency at other banks.18
The final settlement procedure provides the FDIC with a mechanism for resolving potential 
liquidity problems at creditor banks or nonbanks. The netting procedures under FDICIA further 
reduce the risk associated with payments systems. Any remaining credit risk is likely to be small as 
long as banks comply with the limits on interbank credit exposure.19 The final settlement procedures 
and payments system netting together should eliminate most of the liquidity risk associated with 
the payments system. Any remaining liquidity problems could be addressed by the Federal Reserve 
discount window. Although FDICIA places increased limits on the discount window, as mentioned 
earlier, the Fed may still lend to adequately capitalized banks and to undercapitalized banks that 
the Fed (or the bank’s primary federal supervisor) certifies as viable.
Unresolved issues
FDICIA addresses a number of issues associated with large bank failure. However, at least two 
possible areas of concern remain: the effect of a large bank’s failure on financial markets and the 
effect of sudden massive losses at one or more banks. 
Financial  markets.  A  bank’s  failure  could  adversely  affect  selected  financial  markets 
by forcing the immediate unwinding of a large number of hedging transactions, by weakening 
confidence in derivative products that create credit exposure, and by causing the loss of one 
market maker.20 These relatively new issues have received less attention than many others related 
to systemic risk. Nonetheless, some preliminary analysis is possible.21 
Knowledge of the implications of large bank failures is most limited in the area of over-the-
counter derivative products such as interest rate, foreign exchange, and commodity swaps. Available 
insight has been derived primarily from the failures of a few large financial institutions, including 
Drexel, Burnham, Lambert and the Bank of New England. These products seem to have several 
difficulties, but the biggest ones appear unrelated to systemic risk issues. The problems include 
(1) contract language in many swap agreements that may yield a windfall profit to counterparties 
of the failed bank, (2) the occasional inability to unwind derivative contracts at market prices after 
the institutions’ financial problems have become apparent, and (3) increased cost of or inability 
to maintain adequate hedges at the failed institution while it is unwinding its derivatives book.22 
10
18. The only case in which the failure of one bank could cause insolvency at other banks would be that of a well-capitalized 
bank failing suddenly and its remaining assets providing creditors with a low recovery rate. These unexpected losses 
would have to be massive under the currently proposed capital requirements for prompt corrective action because a 
well-capitalized bank must maintain a total capital-to-risk-assets ratio of at least 10 percent. 
19. The limits on interbank credit extension may not be effective at preventing insolvency if a group of related banks fail. 
For example, if a set of international banks from a foreign country were ordered by its government to stop payments, 
limits on exposure to any single bank might not be effective. 
20. See Holland (1992) for a discussion of some of the risks in the swaps market. That analysis focuses on the credit risks 
posed by the interbank market for swaps. However, the issues raised by interbank credit exposure to swaps are not 
fundamentally different from the issues raised by other types of interbank credit exposure. 
21. For a general discussion of the risks posed by over-the-counter derivatives to banking organizations see Hansell and 
Muehring (l992). 
22. See Shirreff (1991) and Torres (199l) for discussion of some of the problems encountered in unwinding the derivatives 
books of some large financial firms. Shirreff (1992) discusses some of the regulators’ general concerns about the 
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The failure of a bank with a large over-the-counter derivatives book poses two risks to 
its counterparties: credit risk and the risk that the derivatives contract will be closed and the 
counterparty will lose its hedge. Evaluation of the credit risk is complicated by the nature of most 
derivatives. Although the size of many markets for over-the-counter derivatives, such as interest 
rate swaps, is measured by the notional principal of the underlying contracts, this measure 
generally overstates risks for two reasons. Actual payments on many types of derivatives are a 
small fraction of the notional principaI.23 Further, at any 
given time a bank is likely to be winning on some contracts 
and  losing  on  others.  Credit  losses  to  a  failed  bank’s 
counterparties arise only on those contracts under which 
the failed bank owes money.24 
However, the measure that is the obvious alternative 
to the notional principal, the current credit exposure of the 
derivatives book (mark-to-market value of those contracts 
that have positive value to the bank), may understate expo-
sure for many banks affected by systemic risk. The credit exposure on derivative contracts varies 
with changes in the value of the underlying commodity (interest rates, foreign exchange rates, 
and so forth). In a systemic risk situation, there may be sharp price movements in the underlying 
commodity and large changes in the value, and hence credit exposure, of banks’ over-the-counter 
derivatives book. Current U.S. regulatory practice at least partially compensates for the increased 
risk by requiring banks to maintain capital proportionate to the amount of potential increases 
in credit exposure.25 The potential losses to derivative counterparties are limited in two ways: 
expected credit losses from failed organizations will likely be a small fraction of exposure, and 
liquidity problems may be addressed by final settlement procedures or the discount window. 
A potentially serious problem related to over-the-counter derivatives is the effect of failure 
on the hedging position of counterparties. These derivatives purchased from large commercial 
bank dealers are used by corporations and institutions to hedge exposure to interest rate, foreign 
exchange,  and  commodity  price  changes.  The  failure  of  the  bank  dealer  may  result  in  early 
termination of the contracts, raising concerns in two areas. First, the bank’s counterparties need 
to know when the contract will be terminated so that they can arrange for a substitute hedge.26 
The second consideration is that the counterparties affected by early termination of derivatives 
contracts will need to reestablish their hedge positions in the over-the-counter derivatives market 
as quickly as possible to minimize their risk exposure. Most financially strong corporate and 
institutional users would be unlikely to have problems doing so, given the number of dealers in 
11
23. For example, consider an interest rate swap with a notional principal of $100 million. One party agrees to pay a fixed 
rate of 8 percent and the other party agrees to pay the London interbank offered rate (LIBOR) for five years. The $100 
million notional principal will never change hands. The party that owes the larger interest payment will pay an amount 
to the other party equal to the absolute value of LIBOR minus 8 percent. 
24. Further, many master derivatives contracts between two parties provide for netting across contracts so that gains on 
one contract may be offset by losses on other contracts. 
25. See Wall, Pringle, and McNulty (1990) for a discussion of the (credit) risk-based capital guidelines as applied to over-
the-counter interest rate and foreign exchange derivatives. 
26. This issue may require some sensitivity on the part of the FDIC to the needs of the bank’s counterparties. For 
example, the FDIC ordinarily likes to close a bank on a Friday after the U.S. financial markets close. If all over-the-
counter derivatives are terminated at this point, those users that lack access to foreign markets may have problems 
arranging substitute hedges before Monday morning and would therefore be exposed to any changes in market prices 
during the weekend. A possible solution would be for swap contracts to provide that if a bank should fail at the start 
of a weekend the contract would be terminated at a fixed time on Monday morning and the remaining obligations 
of the two parties would be based on market prices at the time of termination. The FDIC may have to agree to this 
arrangement. The one risk in such an arrangement would be that some dealers may try to manipulate market prices 
around the termination time, but doing so is likely to be difficult in a market with a large number of users trying to 
arrange substitute hedges. 
In a systemic risk situation, there 
may be sharp price movements in 
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most markets. However, users whose financial condition had weakened may face greater costs in 
arranging a hedge.27 
There may also be systemic implications in the failure of a large bank that results in the 
immediate termination of all over-the-counter derivatives contracts. Such a failure on the part of a 
major bank dealer could significantly, if only temporarily, reduce dealer capacity in some derivatives 
markets. Further, even if remaining dealers have the capacity to service the additional demand, 
individual dealers may face binding bilateral credit limits that restrict their ability to deal with 
specific counterparties.28 Although these limits are most likely to be binding on interdealer hedging 
trades, that dynamic could reduce dealers’ ability to arrange hedges for end-users.29 Credit limits 
may also pose a problem in another way: new information that enters the market through a bank 
failure may cause a reevaluation and possible reduction of selected credit lines by some dealers. 
There is, therefore, at least the potential for some users to face significant problems reestablishing 
their hedges in the wake of a major bank dealer’s failure. 
It is important, however, in evaluating the use of the too big to fail doctrine to protect financial 
markets, to recognize that whatever problems arise are rooted in a bank’s failure, not its treatment 
of creditors. Providing the protection for uninsured creditors is significant only in that preventing 
runs may allow more time for the development of new market makers and expanded capacity at 
existing firms. Even this significance is limited, though, because a bank will come under prompt 
corrective action provisions as its capital position declines, and market participants will be warned 
about the possible restrictions facing a large market maker. Further, if the loss of market-making 
capacity through an institution’s closing would pose a serious problem, then supervisors should 
consider encouraging the bank to begin phasing out its market-making activities before it becomes 
critically undercapitalized so that the market may gradually adjust to the reduced capacity. 
Financial markets are also likely to take actions that would reduce their costs associated 
with the loss of a market maker if the problem bank’s financial condition deteriorates gradually. 
Market participants may shift business to other market makers as a hedge against the institution’s 
possible failure. Moreover, the troubled bank may find that its trading operations are more 
valuable if sold than if forced to operate as part of a financially weak organization.30 Alternatively, 
there may be market adjustment through the individuals whose trading and technical expertise 
are at the heart of any securities trading operation. These key people may seek to leave the ailing 
bank or may be bid away by an organization having the resources to support and expand their 
trading operations. 
12
27. Many derivatives products involve two-sided credit risk. If a user’s credit quality has deteriorated sufficiently, dealers 
may not be willing to take the credit risk ordinarily involved with products like forward contracts and swaps. Some 
derivatives contracts contain clauses to protect the parties against material adverse changes in the financial condition of 
their counterparties, and such contracts would force the parties to recognize deterioration in the user’s condition prior 
to its failure. However, financially weakened users may need to provide additional protection to the dealer in order to 
reestablish their hedge if the derivatives contract contains no such clause. For example, rather than using an ordinary 
interest rate swap without collateral to protect against an increase in market interest rates, the user may be required 
to post collateral with the dealer or buy an interest rate cap. 
28. Virtually all dealers impose a limit on their maximum credit to any given counterparty. The limit is established according 
to the counterparty’s size and financial strength. The maximum exposure limits aggregate exposure from all types of 
credit risk, including any loans. See Arak, Goodman, and Rones (1986) for an example of ways a dealer could calculate 
its credit exposure on an interest rate swap and Chew (1992) for a recent discussion of a bank’s management of deriva-
tives credit risk. 
29. The clientele of some dealers tends to be weighted toward one side of the derivatives market. For example, the customer 
bases of some commercial banks may be weighted toward firms that wish to pay a fixed rate of interest on their interest 
rate swaps. The bank ends up having a concentration of floating rate contracts. One common way for these commercial 
banks to hedge their transactions is to arrange offsetting swaps in which the bank pays a fixed rate with a dealer that has a 
different clientele. If credit lines became exhausted in the interdealer market, dealers could have more problems hedging 
deals with their natural clientele and, thus, be less willing to offer over-the-counter derivatives to their usual customers. 
30. Financially weak banks may handicap trading operations in a number of ways. Their presence may bring the general 
credibility of the trading operations into question with customers. FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ATLANTA
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Overall, there are some risks to financial securities markets when a large bank fails. Although the 
problems are likely to be temporary, some users may very well have problems arranging substitute 
hedges in a timely manner. Further research is needed on several issues: (1) the rate at which lost 
market-making capacity is replaced, (2) the likelihood that credit limits restrict dealers’ ability to 
service users and engage in interdealer hedging, (3) the significance of the costs associated with a 
temporary reduction in liquidity, and (4) the significance of a large bank’s exposure to risk if it lost 
access to derivative markets for several days. 
If policymakers were to conclude that a too big to fail policy is necessary to protect banks that 
are financial market makers, there would be implications for securities firms that have a similar 
presence  in  many  financial  markets.  Securities  firms  not 
affiliated with bank holding companies currently have neither 
insurance like that provided banks by the FDIC or a mandate 
to comply with safety and soundness regulations like those 
imposed on banks. Although securities firms are partially 
regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission, the 
agency regulates only some subsidiaries, and in any case, 
its historical mandate is consumer protection rather than 
maintaining financial system stability. If certain banks are considered too big to fail in order to 
protect the securities markets, logic would suggest that securities firms should receive similar 
coverage and that the provider of liquidity or solvency guarantees should be able to protect itself 
via banklike safety and soundness regulations. 
Unexpected massive losses. The mechanisms that may soften the impact of failure on the 
financial system are most effective in dealing with slow deterioration of one or more banks. In a 
variety of ways regulators and markets can gradually disengage troubled banks from the financial 
system and limit the damage of failure. However, a sudden massive loss at one or more banks could 
create a situation in which the market’s exposure to a failing bank would be at its maximum, and 
regulators would be in a weak position to implement their full array of crisis management tools. 
Fortunately, such economic losses appear to be exceptional. Sudden losses greater than a 
bank’s capital are possible only if a bank has a very large concentration of risk to a single factor 
such as interest rate risk, foreign exchange rate risk, or having borrowers from a single geographic 
area that is devastated. Rather than truly being sudden, large losses may only appear to be so 
because banks and bank regulators have failed to provide for the timely recognition of reductions 
in asset values. Most often private sector parties will have begun reducing their exposure as soon 
as economic capital is significantly impaired, even though delays in accounting recognition may 
have slowed regulatory action. 
Notwithstanding the extremely low probability of an unexpected failure of a previously well 
capitalized large bank that is engaged in a number of complex activities, such a failure would create a 
big problem for the regulators. The FDIC may be able to avoid invoking the systemic risk exception 
but only if it and the failed bank were exceptionally well prepared for such a contingency. The 
FDIC would have to identify the bank’s insured and uninsured creditors and calculate appropriate 
payouts for each of them. The Federal Reserve could buy a little time for the FDIC by exercising 
its discount window power to lend to a critically undercapitalized bank for five days. However, the 
failed bank would be crippled prior to its closure with a massive outflow of uninsured deposits, 
severe limits on its access to the payments system, and an inability to function in the over-the-
counter derivatives market. Even with the additional time, the FDIC probably would be forced to 
establish a bridge bank while it evaluated alternative methods of resolving the failure. Further, the 
FDIC probably would not have time for careful review of the bank’s books to determine the amount 
and type of each of the institution’s liabilities (including off-balance-sheet activities). The FDIC 
could readily evaluate all liabilities only if the bank had organized its financial records in a way that 
permitted quick access. 
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Although it might be possible to manage a single bank’s unexpected failure, the situation 
would probably be unmanageable in the even more unlikely case that the viability of a number of 
large banks became questionable. With several large banks in trouble, depositors would be likely to 
demand immediate withdrawal of their funds, refraining only if the government were providing 100 
percent deposit insurance. Because regulators have limited operational resources (such as people) 
and may also face financial constraints that restrict the number of bank closings they can handle 
at one time, they may want to provide 100 percent coverage as a means to avoid closing too many 
banks in a short period. 
The risk of sudden large losses to individual banks or groups of banks is remote and can be 
further reduced, but it cannot be eliminated. The key to reducing the risk is for institutions to 
minimize concentrations of exposure to specific events that could cause a sharp drop in their value.
Conclusion
FDICIA has mandated that regulators virtually eliminate deposit insurance losses. The act provides 
for a systemic exception to its requirement that problem banks must be resolved at the lowest cost 
to the insurance funds. However, FDICIA also creates some significant political incentives to avoid 
using the systemic risk exception. Moreover, it is clear from the series of measures to address 
specific systemic issues that the intent of Congress was virtually to eliminate the practice of the 
too big to fail doctrine. Congress, having been told that interbank credit created systemic risk, 
mandated limits on interbank credit. Congress learned that delayed access to funds could pose 
a systemic problem, so it authorized the FDIC to use final net settlement. In response to reports 
that the shock waves from a large bank failure could be amplified through the payments system, 
Congress made contractual netting agreements binding. Indeed, Carnell (1992) has noted that the 
original bill passed by the House and the bill introduced to the Senate did not allow for a systemic 
risk exception to least-cost resolution and that the exception was added after regulators and the 
Bush administration asked for the change. The earlier versions of FDICIA relied solely on the 
Federal Reserve’s discount window to address any systemic problems. 
Although FDICIA does not ban the too big to fail doctrine, it has substantially reduced the 
likelihood of future large bank bailouts. Bankers and bank depositors should not casually assume 
that any given bank would be considered too big to fail. Regulators would be well advised to 
look for ways to close a large failing bank without protecting uninsured creditors. If conditions 
were such that a large fraction of the banking system was potentially not viable, regulators may 
have no choice but to protect uninsured depositors.31 However, for most other systemic risk 
situations, including financial market risk, the potential still exists for identifying and developing 
solutions. A careful review of FDICIA’s provisions makes it clear that Congress is looking for an 
end to operating under a too big to fail policy and not for more explanations as to why too big to 
fail treatment is essential. 
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